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A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may
extract rents to the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral
competition and information provided by the media may keep such rent extrac-
tion at bay. We develop a simple model where rents are decreasing in the degree
of political competition and voter information. In line with our theoretical predic-
tions, we ￿nd that both increased political competition and increased local media
coverage substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local
governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).
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11 Introduction
A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the politicians and political
parties in power may use their positions to further their own interests, rather than
the interests of the general public. Depending on the degree of accountability that
politicians are facing, it is possible for them to divert public resources, rents, to their
own or their parties￿pockets. While corruption is the most blatant example of this,
the problem is by no means restricted to corrupt regimes. In fact, most theoretical
treatments of political agency problems between those in power and those governed are
set in a context resembling the workings of modern, well-functioning democracies. In
such models, the incentives for politicians to extract rents are shaped by factors such
as the degree of electoral competition and voter information.1 The central aspect of
corruption ￿that bribes are illegal ￿is usually not considered. Rather, rent extraction
is treated as legal, either by implicit or explicit assumption.2
Despite this, most empirical work on rent extraction has dealt with the determinants
of corruption, not with legal rents.3 The scarce number of empirical papers dealing
with more developed and less corrupt economies have, on the other hand, been using
measures such as tax rates, public employment and wages, growth promoting policies,
and politician quality as proxies for rents.4 However, such variables are more closely
related to slack and ine¢ ciencies than to rents, per se. In this paper, we empirically
analyze the impact of political competition and media coverage on direct measures
of political rents among local governments in a mature and non-corrupt democracy,
namely Sweden.5 We also develop a simple model which allows us to analyze the e⁄ects
of political competition and voter information within the same framework.
The precise nature of political rents is rarely discussed in the theoretical literature.
1 Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) present and discuss several classes of political
agency models.
2 Recently, this has started to change. Both Ferraz and Finan (2007) and Waisman (2008) present
theoretical models where the illegality of corruption is given special attention.
3 The empirical literature on corruption is huge; see Svensson (2005) for an accessible overview.
4 See Besley and Case (2003) and Besley et al (2005).
5 In 2005, Sweden got a corruption score of 9.2 (out of 10) by Transparency International and was
ranked as the sixth least corrupt country in the world.
2The most literal interpretation is that rents are monetary transfers in the form of
public ￿nancing of political parties and excessive wages for top politicians (Persson
and Tabellini, 2000 p.8). In the empirical part of the paper, we use data on precisely
these variables among Swedish local governments. An important feature of the Swedish
system is that both public ￿nancial party support and politicians￿wages are determined
within the local budget and are set by a simple vote in the local council. Moreover, there
are no formal restrictions on the level of public ￿nancial support that the local politicians
can award their parties.6 Using these direct and objective measures of political rents,
we ￿nd that increases in both political competition and local newspaper coverage tend
to substantially reduce both types of rents.
It is not obvious that ￿nancial party support is a good measure of rents. After all,
it is possible that voters have a preference for public sponsoring of political parties.
Three results speak against such a public-interest view. First, we ￿nd that municipali-
ties systematically structure party support such that it favors the ￿nancial interests of
the ruling majorities at the expense of the other parties. Second, we ￿nd there to be
electoral cycles in ￿nancial party support: increases in ￿nancial party support among
local governments facing high competition are relatively low in election years, a ￿nding
which is hard to reconcile with the public interest view.7 Finally, Besley and Preston
(2007) ￿nd that political competition is likely to moderate party-speci￿c policy prefer-
ences. We, on the other hand, ￿nd the same response to political competition among
left- and right-wing municipalities, even though left-wing governments on average spend
more on ￿nancial support to political parties.
Conducting a study of Swedish local governments has several advantages. As Swedish
municipalities all work within the same legal and institutional system, we get around
many of the problems associated with cross-country studies. Still, local governments
6 This said, there are restrictions on how the public support system can be structured. These
restrictions basically say that all parties represented in the local parliament must be treated in a fair
and equal way. Hence, if party X is in power, it cannot decide to only give support to party X.
7 Ansolabehere et al (2003) ￿nd the degree of competition to be strongly related to campaign
spending in US gubernatorial elections. Since the demand for information concerning the political
alternatives is presumably higher when competition is high, a similar pattern in public ￿nancial support
to parties is to be expected ￿if such spending is mainly due to voter demand.
3have considerable ￿scal autonomy and powers of taxation, and local newspapers are
an important source of information about local politics in Sweden. Therefore, we rely
on close to ideal units of observation when trying to isolate the e⁄ects of political
competition and mass media on rents.
As political competition may be a⁄ected by rent extraction, endogeneity is a concern.
In the panel analysis, we use the fact that changes in local political competition are
partly due to general trends independent of local politics. In the cross-sectional analysis,
we use the fact that the current municipal structure was created by a major reform in
the early 1970￿ s. A new set of municipalities, without a previous track record of policy
making and rent extraction, was thus created. At the same time, political preferences
at the local level tend to be stable over time. By aggregating electoral data from the
period before the reform to the present jurisdictional level, we construct an instrument
for political competition. In line with our theoretical predictions, we ￿nd that the IV
estimates are larger than the OLS estimates.
This paper adds to the existing literature in several ways, some of which are men-
tioned above. The basic ￿nding concerning the relation between political competition
and accountability corresponds well to previous research. Besley and Case (2003) ￿nd
that stronger political competition reduces taxes and worker compensation in US local
governments. Using US state level data, Besley et al (2005) ￿nd that increased political
competition leads to higher economic growth, lower taxes, less labor market regulation
and politicians of higher quality. Besides using direct measures of rent extraction, our
paper di⁄ers from previous research by being set in a proportional electoral system with-
out any term limits. Since voters￿capacity to hold politicians accountable is generally
considered to be lower in proportional than in majoritarian systems, it is interesting in
its own right to study accountability in a proportional system.8
While the importance of mass media for keeping the public informed about policy
has long been recognized, it is not until rather recently that this role has been included
8 For theoretical treatments of the e⁄ects of constitutions, see Persson and Tabellini (2000). For
empirics, see Persson and Tabellini (2003). Acemoglu (2005) o⁄ers a critical review of the latter book.
Persson et al (2003) speci￿cally investigate how the electoral system a⁄ects corruption.
4in the formal literature on accountability. In an in￿ uential paper, Besley and Burgess
(2002) ￿nd that governments in India are more responsive to their citizens￿needs when
newspaper coverage and electoral accountability are high. Similarly, Str￿mberg (1999,
2004) ￿nds that US counties with a broad radio coverage received more relief funds
during the New Deal era. More directly related to rent extraction, Reinikka and Svens-
son (2005) use detailed data from a policy experiment in Uganda to document a strong
negative relation between media access and local capture of public funds. The e⁄ect of
local media on accountability within more developed economies has, up to date, been
given less attention.9 Our contribution to this literature is to provide such an analysis
within a country where freedom of the press is guaranteed.
This paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the theoretical model and
the empirical predictions. Section three discusses estimation issues and the data. It
also provides a brief description of the Swedish political institutions relevant to this
study. Section four presents the results and Section ￿ve concludes the paper.
2 A Simple Model
Political rents is a key concept in many models of political agency.10 These rents are
resources being transferred from voters to politicians and from the voters￿perspective,
these rents are pure waste. In this section, we present a simple model where voter biases
reduce political competition which gives room for rent extraction. As a novel feature
of the model, we allow for part of the electorate to be uninformed about the level of
rents.11
In the model, voters are backward looking and decide whether to vote for an incum-
bent party. From voters￿current income I (normalized to one), rents, r 2 [0;1], can be
9 Several papers using cross-country data document a positive relation between free and developed
media and measures of good governance (e.g. Ahrend, 2002; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Adser￿ et al,
2003).
10 See Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) for thorough treatments of several classes of
political agency models.
11 With perfect political competition and well informed voters, rents are usually driven down to
zero (e.g. Wittman, 1989).
5extracted. The incumbent party only cares about rents and about being reelected. The
timing is as follows: First, the incumbent sets the level of rents, taking their negative
e⁄ect on the reelection probability, P(r); into account. Based on the level of rents,
the media decides whether to report on them. The probability of reporting is assumed
to be ￿(r) = r: The intuition behind this assumption is that it is less costly for the
newspaper to dig out information about rents when these are high. Alternatively, the
newspaper considers that subscribers are more interested in reading about large than
small rents. If media reports about rents, information about their level is spread to the
exogenously set share M 2 (0;1) who is subscribing to a newspaper. We assume that
those who read the newspaper derive utility v from doing so. In other words, those
who read the newspaper do so for reasons unrelated to policy issues. Finally, voters
cast their votes based on net income and the information about rents received through
media reporting.
Formally, the incumbent chooses r to maximize the following expression:
r + P(r)R; (1)
where R is the level of exogenous o¢ ce rents that accrue to the party in power. The
value of holding o¢ ce is exogenous from the current level of rent extraction.
The electorate consists of a continuum of voters, i. In line with the probabilistic
voting model by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), voters are assumed to have preferences
over non-policy related aspects of the parties. The average popularity of the incumbent






. The higher the value of z, the higher
is the density of swing voters and the more competitive is the election. Voters vote in
favor of the incumbent if their reservation utility is above a certain threshold level.12







. Since both the individual reservation utility and the average popu-
larity of the incumbent are uniformly distributed, there is uncertainty about both the
bias and the identity of the median voter. Thus, the reelection probability becomes a
12 The opposition party has similar preferences as the incumbent party. Thus, the only reason for
voters not to reelect the incumbent is to punish rent extraction ex post.
6smooth function of rent extraction.13
When the incumbent party decides on the level of rent extraction, it knows the
distributions of the reservation utility and the popularity parameter, but not their
realized values. Apart from net income and the utility from reading the newspaper,
voters have a direct dislike of rents, ￿r, provided that they are informed about them.
An uninformed voter will vote for the incumbent party if her utility is higher than
her reservation utility wi, i.e. if
u
U = I ￿ r + d = 1 ￿ r + d > wi: (2)
Correspondingly, an informed voter will be in favor of the incumbent if
u
I = I ￿ r + d + v ￿ ￿(r)￿r = 1 ￿ r + d + v ￿ ￿r
2 > wi: (3)
The reelection probability for the incumbent is the probability that the share of
voters voting for the incumbent is larger than 1
2: The incumbent sets r to maximize (1).
By inserting (2) and (3) into (1), and taking expectations, the assumptions concerning
the distribution of the reservation utility give the incumbent the following expression
to maximize with respect to r:14
r + P(r)R = r + (
1
2
+ z[1 + Mv ￿ r ￿ M￿r
2])R: (4)






Since rents are non-negative, we know that 1 ￿ zR: Therefore, we can sign the FOC
with respect to the main variables of interest, z and M:
13 This is a general feature of probabilistic voting models.
14 To see this, notice that the reelection probability is Pr(1
2 + MuI + (1 ￿ M)uU ￿ 1
2): Therefore,
P(r) = Pr(d ￿ M￿r2 ￿ 1 ￿ Mv + r) and hence, P(r) = 1

























2R￿zM2 (Rz ￿ 1) < 0:
The derivatives in (6) show that rents are decreasing in both z and M. In other
words, both increased political competition and increased media coverage help keeping
rent extraction at bay. Despite the simplifying assumptions in this model, the result
that rents are decreasing in competition and media coverage is quite general. Both
high competition and increased news coverage make voters respond more to the same
level of rent extraction. Since responsive voters punish the incumbent by reducing the
reelection probability, this keeps rents low.
3 Empirical strategy, data and measurement issues
Our main units of analysis are Swedish municipalities, but we also make use of county-
level data. In this section, we describe the features of the institutional environment. We
then outline the empirical strategies employed when testing the predictions regarding
political competition and voter information on rent extraction. Finally, measurement
issues are discussed and the data is presented.
3.1 The Institutional Environment
The Swedish political system consists of three levels of government: central government,
counties and municipalities. As mentioned in the Introduction, Swedish local govern-
ments have the constitutional right of self-governance; they set their own income taxes
and they decide on their own budget. That the autonomy from central government
is not only formal has been shown in several empirical studies on the e⁄ects of local
8government on policy (e.g. Pettersson-Lidbom 2001, 2008). Moreover, governance of
local governments is of real importance in the Swedish system. Total spending in 2003
was 17 percent of GDP at the municipal level and 8 percent of GDP at the county level.
Today, the main areas of responsibility of the municipalities are schooling, child
care and care of the elderly, while the main responsibilities of the counties are health
and medical care. In 1970, local governments were given the legal right to dedicate
resources from the local budget to the parties represented in the elected council. The
primary focus of this study is this local public ￿nancial support to political parties.
Since this opportunity was introduced, local public support to the political parties has
increased in both municipalities and counties. In 2003, the municipalities spent around
300 million and the counties around 200 million Swedish kronor (a total of about 55
million Euros) on party support. While these sums are trivial as compared to total
expenditures (or GDP), local party support is an important source of revenue for the
parties. In fact, more than half of the total revenues come from local public support
from municipalities and counties (Svenska Dagbladet, 2004).15
The level of public support to political parties is decided by the elected representa-
tives themselves in the budget, after a vote in the local council. In e⁄ect, it is therefore
the ruling majority that decides on the size of the monetary support. Initially, the
only restriction on the construction of the support was that all parties represented in
the council should be included. Since 1992, there has been an additional requirement
that parties should be treated equally.16 An interesting feature of the system is that
all parties receive the support ￿not only the winning coalition. Local governments
also decide on a sharing rule that includes a base (per party) and a variable (per seat)
￿nancial support and there is considerable variation in their relative levels. One part of
our analysis will exploit this variation to see if the sharing rule systematically bene￿ts
15 Party ￿nancing in Sweden is surprisingly nontransparent. According to the estimates in
Svenska Dagbladet (2004), another 250 million SEK of the party revenues are public party support
determined by the national parliament. Other contributions (including membership fees) add up to
230 million SEK.
16 What "equally" means is not de￿ned. In e⁄ect, it means that two parties with equal representation
in the local parliament receive the same level of support. The actual sharing rules di⁄er substantially
between municipalities.
9the ruling majority. Finally, we study the wages paid to politicians in municipalities
as an alternative measure of rents. Wages are also determined by the local council and
are part of the municipal budget.
Some words about the political system are of relevance here. Sweden has a parlia-
mentary system with proportional representation. As is common in this type of system,
a number of parties are represented in the elected assemblies. Although there are sev-
eral parties, there is a quite clear dividing line between left-wing and right-wing parties
leading to a fairly stable two-bloc system. The Social Democrats, the Left Party and
the Green Party are considered to constitute the left-wing coalition.17 The right-wing
coalition consists of the Conservatives, the Liberals, the Centre Party, the Christian De-
mocrats and New Democracy (only in the 1992-1995 period). Nationally active parties
traditionally play an important role in Swedish politics and there are few local par-
ties of importance at the county and municipality level. At both levels of government,
elections are held on the third Sunday in September and there are no interim elections.
Swedish newspapers are of a highly local nature. In what might be an exception
in comparison to some other parts of the world, local newspapers usually cover local
politics on a regular basis. While a few papers (Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet)
are being read nationally, they have very limited coverage outside the Stockholm (the
capital) region.18 Printed media is important for getting access to information about
politics and policy in Sweden. According to surveys of the Swedish electorate, voters
reading the local newspapers are generally much better informed than other voters.19
17 The Green Party entered the national parliament after the election in 1988. While this party
has claimed to stand independent from both the left- and the right-wing blocs, they are best classi￿ed
as left wing. The Green Party has, for example, only once supported a right-wing coalition in any
of the counties. Further, in a detailed survey of municipal majorities after the 1994 election, it was
found that it was four times more likely to support a left-wing coalition than a right-wing coalition
(Kommunaktuellt, 1995). In addition, after the elections in 1998 and 2002, it has been part of the
left-wing coalition supporting the Social Democratic minority government in the national parliament.
Finally, ever since the Green Party entered the political arena in 1982, voters in general have placed
the Green Party on the left-hand side of the political spectrum, and the voters for the Green Party
have placed themselves on the same side (Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2004; Tables 5.1 and 5.2).
18 These two papers also cover local politics in the Stockholm area but not in the rest of the country.
19 Holmberg and Oscarsson (2004; Table 9.5).
103.2 Empirical strategy
The theoretical framework shows that stronger political competition should reduce po-
litical rents. We will study both the long-term e⁄ects using cross-sectional data and
the impact of changes in competition and media coverage using panel data. Since
the variation in political competition is larger between than within municipalities, a
cross-sectional approach is informative. However, a concern about omitted variables
motivates the use of panel data.
Using cross-sectional data, the baseline regression model takes the form:
Political Rentsi = ￿ + ￿1Political competitioni + ￿2V oter informationi (7)
+￿Controlsi + ￿i;
where Political Rentsi is our measure of rent extraction by local government i, ￿ is a
constant and Political competitioni is our measure of political competition. The model
also makes predictions concerning the impact of voter information on political rents.
Therefore, we introduce the variable V oter informationi; proxied by local newspa-
per coverage, as a measure of municipal-level information on political rent extraction.
Controlsi is a vector of control variables such as population size, income per capita,
and the share of the population with higher education. Finally, ￿i is the usual i.i.d.
error term. A thorough discussion of the choice of proxies and data is provided in the
next section.
To analyze the within municipal determinants of rent extraction, we make use of
panel data that allows us to control for municipal-level ￿xed e⁄ects (￿i) and ￿xed time
e⁄ects (￿t). When running panel regressions, we cluster the standard errors at the
municipal (or county) level to account for serial correlation within each legislative unit.
The estimating equation in this case is:
11Political Rentsit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿1Political competitionit + (8)
￿2V oter informationit + ￿Controlsit + ￿it:
To widen our understanding of the impact of political competition on rent extraction,
we also analyze whether political competition is an important determinant of how rent
extraction responds to income shocks. Empirically, we then interact our measure of
political competition with municipal per capita income in a ￿xed e⁄ects setting, such
as (8).
Naturally, endogeneity is a concern in such an empirical study. Theory tells us
that low political competition will push rents upwards. High rents will, in turn, induce
some voters to vote for the opposition party. Since political competition is measured
after rent extraction has taken place, measured political competition will seem to be
tougher than the actual underlying degree of competition. For this reason, we expect
the coe¢ cient ￿1 to be biased towards zero. Another possibility (not based on our
theoretical model) is that political rents help the incumbent preserve the status quo.
If this is the case, we would tend to exaggerate the e⁄ects of competition on rents.
For these reasons, we discuss below how to instrument for political competition in a
cross-sectional and a panel setting.
Although the question of reverse causality is less severe for local newspaper coverage,
a drawback of this study is that we have no credible instrument for coverage. Our
major concern is, however, that an omitted variable, such as the general knowledge
level, a⁄ects both coverage and political rents. To limit this problem, we include other
variables that should pick up any such e⁄ects.
3.3 Data and measurement issues
The number of municipalities has grown from 278 in 1974 to 290 in 2004. In our data set,
there is a maximum of 254 municipalities since we drop those that have split or merged
over the years. Depending on which instrument we use, a couple of municipalities are
12omitted due to data constraints. The main sources of data are the Swedish Association
of Local Authorities and Regions and Statistics Sweden. Although municipalities are
the main objects of study, we also make use of county-level information. Today, there
are 20 counties, 18 of which have existed throughout our sample period. The remaining
two were created in 1997-1998 through the amalgamation of ￿ve di⁄erent counties.
Therefore, we have a maximum of 23 di⁄erent county-level units of observation. For a
detailed description of the data sample and sources for the individual variables, see the
Data Appendix and Appendix Table A.1.
3.3.1 Measures of rents
We will use the per capita local public ￿nancial support to political parties, Party Sup-
port, as our main measure of political rents. As argued in the Introduction, this variable
is close to a literal interpretation of ￿rents￿in the theoretical literature. Municipal-
level data on Party Support is available for every post election year from 1974 to 2003.20
Even though data is only available for these years, the level of party support is deter-
mined in the annual budget and may thus change during the election cycle. Part of the
analysis will also be undertaken at the county level for which annual data is available.
The major drawback of this variable is that it does not capture all political rents,
while the main advantage is that the measurement problems are limited. Another
concern is that ￿nancial party support might be viewed as something voters actually
require. The main reason for this would be informational ￿voters want all parties to
have the means of providing information about their policies and conduct informative
election campaigns. However, it is reasonable to expect demand for such information
to be especially high when competition between the political alternatives is ￿erce ￿if
voters have no intention of changing the party for which they vote, they do not need to
become informed about the alternatives.21 This would lead us to ￿nd a positive e⁄ect
20 Elections were held in 1973, ￿ 76, ￿ 79, ￿ 82, ￿ 85, ￿ 88, ￿ 91, ￿ 94, ￿ 98, and 2002. In the mid-1990￿ s, the
authority responsible for gathering this data was changed. Due to this change, data was obviously
misreported in some municipalities and for this reason, we drop 11 municipalities. See details in
the Data Appendix.
21 Ansolabehere et al (2003) ￿nd that the degree of both inter- and intra party competition is
13of political competition on party support. In Section 4.2, we address this concern and
show results that are consistent with the view that Party Support should indeed be
viewed as a measure of rents.
Our second measure of political rents is the wage paid to the highest ranking full-
time employed politician. We make use of two sources to construct this variable, one
from 1974-1989 which only reports the level of wages and one from 1990-1999 which
also reports the age and gender of the politician. Although wages are also determined
by the local council and are monetary transfers from tax payers to politicians, we do
not consider them to be as good a measure of political rent as party support. There are
several reasons for this. First, voters may want to pay their politicians high wages in
order to give them incentives to act in the interest of the electorate. Second, wages may
a⁄ect candidate selection and thereby a⁄ect policy.22 Thus, the motive for high wages
may not be rent extraction but may re￿ ect the electorate￿ s demand for high quality
performance. Finally, Sweden has a party dominated political system where the leading
representatives are selected through the internal nomination processes within each party.
The parties, in turn, have little to gain from extracting rents by raising personal wages.
However, as the leading politician of a party can have a very strong position and may
use this to further his/her own interest, we include this as an alternative measure of
rent extraction.23
Table 1 shows summary statistics for all variables used in the study. Notice that
all values are de￿ ated into 2000 year prices. Over the period, average (unweighted)
￿nancial party support was almost 32 Swedish kronor per capita with a large variation
both across municipalities and over time. In 2003, the municipality with the lowest
level of ￿nancial party support, S￿derk￿ping, only spent 8 kronor per capita on party
support, whereas Haparanda with the highest spending allocated 121 kronor per capita
to party support. As can be seen in the third row of Table 1, there is also substantial
strongly related to campaign spending in US gubernatorial elections.
22 For a discussion of the e⁄ect of pay on politicians, see Besley (2004).
23 In a study of US gubernatorial wages, Di Tella and Fisman (2004) ￿nd support for the idea that
wages are partly determined by rent extraction motives.
14variation in our second proxy for rents, politicians￿wages.
TABLE 1 HERE
3.3.2 Measuring political competition
Several di⁄erent measures of political competition have been used by other researchers.24
Here, we follow much of the literature and use the absolute di⁄erence between the left-
wing and the right-wing bloc. Political competition is de￿ned as 1 minus the absolute
di⁄erence between blocs. The average level of competition is 0.81 which means that,
on average, the majority bloc has 60 percent of the votes. While this may seem like a
comfortable majority, in 25 percent of the municipalities the leading majority has less
than 53.5 percent of the votes. The main drawback of this measure is that there are no
watertight locks between the political blocs as we de￿ne them. In some municipalities,
parties form coalitions across the traditional right- and left-wing boundaries of Swedish
politics, which introduces some noise into this measure.
The absolute value of the di⁄erence between the political blocs is easily calculated
and it is a good measure of swing voters, provided that the distribution of ideological
preferences is symmetric, single peaked, and only two parties are competing for power.
Since these assumptions do not necessarily hold, we use the cut point density measure,
Cutpoint density, derived by Johansson (2003) to check the robustness of the main
results.25 Johansson estimates the number of swing voters using factor analysis and
a kernel density estimator using data on ideological preferences from the large scale
Swedish election surveys conducted in connection with the 1991 and 1994 elections.
Using the attitudes conveyed by responses concerning the voters￿feelings towards po-
litical parties and politicians, a distribution of preferences at the constituency level is
24 Besley and Case (2003) provide a comprehensive survey of measures of political competition. In
their study of the e⁄ect of political competition on policy in US states, they use a measure based on
the distance from 0.5 in the fraction of seats held by one party. Dahlberg and M￿rk (2006) use the
absolute distance between the left- and right-wing blocs, and a measure of party fragmentation in a
study of bureaucrats￿wages in Swedish local governments.
25 We are grateful to Eva M￿rk (previously Johansson) for sharing her data with us.
15derived. This way, the strength of ideological preferences over the full distribution of
voters is calculated to derive the density of potential swing voters in each constituency.
As there are several municipalities in each constituency, this distribution is assumed
to be the same for all municipalities in each constituency. The actual position of each
municipality in the preference distribution is then derived using the municipal level
election results for the previous election.26 These measures overlap with the rest of the
data for the time periods 1992 and 1995.
3.3.3 Instrumentation
As discussed above, endogeneity may be an issue when using a measure of political
competition such as ours. Therefore, we want to construct an instrument re￿ ecting the
underlying degree of political competition, but which is una⁄ected by the current level
of rent extraction. To achieve this, we make use of the fact that the current municipal
structure did not exist prior to the early 1970￿ s. The present structure was created
when a major municipal reform led to a reduction in the number of municipalities from
about 1000 to 278.27 The main objective of the reform was to create more e¢ cient
administrative units, an important issue since the municipalities were to handle much
of the rapidly growing public service provision. The reform also aimed at maintaining
local democracy and local self-government. For these purposes, it was important that
the municipalities were su¢ ciently large to have a stable tax base and the capacity
to implement policy. Originally, the amalgamation of municipalities was meant to be
voluntary, but since the process was slow, the national parliament decided to force the
new structure onto the municipalities in 1969. In the reform process, a uni￿ed type
of municipalities with clearly de￿ned responsibilities replaced the previously existing
three types of municipalities.28
26 There are 28 constituencies in Sweden. Each municipality belongs to one of these. See Johansson
(2003) for details concerning the construction of this measure.
27 An earlier reform, in 1952, reduced the number of municipalities from 2498 to 1037 (Gustafsson,
1978).
28 For a thorough discussion of the motivation behind the reform, see SOU (1961). Gustafsson
(1980) has analyzed the reform from a political science perspective.
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before the amalgamation of municipalities, and aggregate these to the current municipal
structure to create the instrument polcomp68. Since the current municipal structure did
not exist before the reform, instruments based on election results prior to this reform
should re￿ ect underlying political sympathies rather than post-reform policy making.
At the same time, voting patterns are quite stable over time, making the instrument a
good predictor of future election results.
Naturally, rent extraction could have existed even under the previous municipal
structure. However, the reform was motivated by the radical increase in municipal
responsibilities during the 1970￿ s and thus also the size of the local budget. With the
reform came also the possibility for local governments to hand out public party support
and leading politicians began to be paid wages for holding o¢ ce. The larger municipal
units that were created are also likely to have made the monitoring of local politicians
more di¢ cult. Therefore, it is fair to say that the reform increased the scope for rent
extraction quite dramatically. Moreover, since there was a fundamental change in the
municipal structure, political competition may now be very di⁄erent from the situation
before the reform. For these reasons, an instrument based on election results prior to
the municipal reform should re￿ ect underlying political sympathies that are less a⁄ected
by rent extraction than the current degree of political competition.
As it is time invariant, polcomp68 does not work in a panel setting, for which we
need a time varying-instrument. To construct such an instrument, we use the fact
that voter movements between parties are to a some extent due to general trends,
independent of local politics. For example, the actions of the national government,
or governments in other countries, may a⁄ect the voting pattern at the local level for
reasons that are completely unrelated to local politics. These trends can increase or
decrease local competition, depending on which parties are in power locally. Therefore,
we use the national election results in the municipalities bordering a municipality to
capture the exogenous variation in local political competition. This means that if the
left-wing bloc increases its vote share in a neighboring municipality, this is associated
17with a reduction in political competition if a municipality is run by left-wing parties,
but associated with an increase in competition if it is run by the right-wing bloc.
We create the instrument blocdi⁄ as the average di⁄erence expressed in percent in
bordering municipalities between the left-wing (right-wing) and right-wing (left-wing)
bloc in municipalities governed by a left-wing (right-wing) majority.
The identifying assumption is that the variation in election outcomes among neigh-
boring municipalities is orthogonal to rent extraction in a particular municipality. Thus,
general changes in the preferences of the electorate are assumed not to be a⁄ected by
rent extraction in a particular municipality. In a cross-sectional setting, however, the
geographical concentration in preferences results in correlation between municipalities
in political competition and therefore, correlation in rent extraction.
3.3.4 Media
According to the model, voter information about rents is important for rent extrac-
tion. Our proxy for voter information about local politics is the household coverage
ratio of local newspapers. The Swedish local media markets are naturally connected
to the municipal structure. While a number of newspapers have coverage in several
municipalities, most people within a municipality tend to read one or a couple of local
newspapers.
Data describing coverage and political color of all local newspapers is provided by
Tidningsstatistik AB. This company gathers detailed newspaper data to facilitate the
sale of advertisements across Sweden. Using this data, we derive the variable coverage
as the sum of household coverage (percent of households buying the paper) of local
newspapers that have a coverage of at least 10 percent and are published at least twice
a week.
3.3.5 Control variables
Further, to isolate the e⁄ects, we control for a number of other factors. Population is
the log of population, included to capture e⁄ects such as economies of scale in running
18a political party. Income is the log of income per capita, included to account for the
amount of possible rent extraction, and for di⁄erences in voter preferences. Leftwing is
de￿ned as the left-wing vote share. This is included to account for di⁄erences in the
relative dislike of rents among voters. To rule out that the media coverage variable
picks up e⁄ects of having a more well educated population, we also include the share
of inhabitants with higher education, high edu. This variable is only available from
1985 and onwards and is therefore not included in all speci￿cations. When studying
the determinants of politicians￿wages, we also include a dummy, gender, which takes
on the value of one if the politician is a woman as well as the politician￿ s age (and age
squared). Further, to adjust for cost of living di⁄erences, we control for average house
prices.
4 Empirical results
Our main empirical predictions are that high political competition will tend to reduce
public ￿nancial support for political parties and politicians￿wages. Further, we expect
high local media coverage to reduce these rents. As can be seen in Table 2, there is a
statistical signi￿cant correlation of ￿ 0.20 between public ￿nancial support for political
parties and our main variable measuring political competition, political competition.29
The correlation between public ￿nancial support and cutpoint density is ￿ 0.25. The
correlation is close to zero between politicians￿wages and political competition, while it
is ￿ 0.15 for cutpoint density.
For local newspaper coverage, the correlation is ￿ 0.25 for party support and ￿ 0.32 for
wages. Thus, the raw correlations point in the direction indicated by theory. Political
competition seems to be stronger in municipalities with a larger population and there
is no correlation with average educational attainment. The instruments polcomp68 and
blocdi⁄ are strongly correlated with the measures of political competition. The relation
between coverage and other variables is more surprising, especially the negative corre-
29 This negative relation is rather smooth which can be shown by running a non-parametric kernel
regression.
19lation between media coverage and both income per capita and the share of inhabitants
with a high education. There is no signi￿cant correlation between our measures of
political competition and media coverage.
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Before we move on to the formal empirical analysis of political competition and rent
extraction, it is illustrative to graphically depict the evolution of municipal- and county-
level party support over time. We divide the regions into more or less competitive
groups. For municipalities, we see that party support is substantially higher in the
group where the time period average level of political competition is above the 75th
percentile than in the group below the 25th percentile. For counties, we have detailed
data on actual majorities rather than the proxy used for municipalities. In about half
of the counties, at least one party has been part of the ruling majority throughout the
time period. Figure 2 clearly shows how there has been a substantially larger increase
in party support among those counties as compared to the reference group.30
FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE
We start by analyzing the relationship between political competition and ￿nancial
party support. Then, we turn to a discussion of whether ￿nancial support to political
parties should really be viewed as rents. Finally, we move on to investigate the relation
between political accountability and politicians￿wages.
4.1 Political accountability and ￿nancial party support
In Table 3, we see that the prediction regarding the relation between political compe-
tition and ￿nancial party support ￿nds substantial support in the data.
In the ￿rst column, using the variable political competition to measure political
competition, we ￿nd a highly signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of competition on party support,
30 We have estimated if the change in party support over the whole time period is signi￿cantly
related to the average level of political competition (including covariates). This is indeed the case,
regardless of whether we measure competition by the di⁄erence between the political blocs or by
an indicator for one party always being in the majority.
20using cross-sectional data from 2003.31 A coe¢ cient of ￿ 15.9 means that by increasing
political competition by one standard deviation, rents are reduced by 2.3 Swedish kronor
per inhabitant, or 6.2 percent as compared to the mean level of rents. By moving from
the lowest to the highest value of political competition in our sample, rents are reduced
by 11.7 kronor per inhabitant (32 percent as compared to mean rents).
In column two, we instrument for political competition using political competition
in the 1968 parliamentary election (polcomp68). The F-test (101.98) from the ￿rst-stage
regression indicates that the instrument is very strong. Consistent with our theoretical
prediction that the OLS estimates are biased towards zero, we ￿nd that the size of the
e⁄ect of political competition is larger when using IV. A standard deviation increase
in our competition measure reduces party support by 3 Swedish kronor or 8.4 percent
for the municipality with average political competition. This indicates that rents are
indeed pushed up in such a way that measured political competition is higher than the
underlying degree of competition. Thus, the political parties appear to be ready to lose
some votes to gain higher rents.
The other explanatory variables in columns one and two do not seem to a⁄ect
the level of party support. The exception is the share of left-wing votes which is
associated with higher rents. This result could either indicate that left-wing voters
are less reluctant to give public ￿nancial support to political parties, or that left-wing
parties are more inclined to extract this type of rent.
In columns three and four, we use our other measure of political competition, cut-
point density, for the year 1995.32 The pattern from regressions one and two repeats
itself: the OLS estimates are highly signi￿cant and the point estimates are even larger
when using IV. The size of the e⁄ect is somewhat larger as compared to political compe-
tition: a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable implies a decrease
in party support of between 3.5 (OLS) and 5.6 (IV) Swedish kronor for cutpoint density
(i.e. between 10 and 16 percent as compared to the sample mean).
31 If we use the average level of political competition throughout the sample period, we get somewhat
stronger results.
32 Political competition is also highly signi￿cant for 1995.
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While our instrument is likely to be valid regarding direct reverse causality from
rents to political competition, we cannot rule out that the results su⁄er from an omitted
variable bias. In the next four columns of Table 3, we exploit the panel dimension
of the data and introduce municipal and time-￿xed e⁄ects to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. For the variable political competition, used in column ￿ve, we have a
long panel. While the point estimate of political competition remains negative, it is not
statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels. In the next column, we instrument for
political competition using the changes in popularity of the two blocs in the bordering
municipalities (blocdi⁄ ). The e⁄ect of political competition is now much stronger and
statistically signi￿cant. In fact, the point estimate in the panel IV-speci￿cation is
strikingly similar to the cross-sectional IV-estimate although the size of the standardized
e⁄ect is somewhat smaller. Using the estimate in column six, a within municipality
standard deviation increase in political competition increases party support by 1.8
Swedish kronor or about 5.8 percent.
For our other measure of political competition, cutpoint density, data is only avail-
able for two time periods, 1992 and 1995. Keeping this limitation in mind, the results
in column seven show that an increase in the density of swing voters is signi￿cantly
associated with a reduction in rent extraction. Instrumenting for political competition
does not change the result (column eight). As is true for all speci￿cations in Table 3,
the estimated e⁄ect is larger using IV.
4.1.1 Adding media
In this section, we add mass media coverage to the analysis. In the ￿rst two columns
of Table 4, local newspaper coverage is added to the basic OLS and IV cross-sectional
speci￿cations. The point estimate is negative and statistically signi￿cant, indicating
that local media does indeed play a role in reducing political rent extraction. A coe¢ -
cient of about ￿ 0.13 means that by increasing media coverage by one standard deviation,
22rents are reduced by 2.1 kronor. The point estimate of political competition is some-
what increased by the inclusion of coverage. It is useful to note that including political
competition and coverage improves the ￿t of the regression from an R-squared of 0.181
to 0.208, i.e. by 16%.
TABLE 4 HERE
In columns three and four, we run panel regressions including municipal and time
period ￿xed e⁄ects. The impact of media coverage is still negative and highly statisti-
cally signi￿cant after taking the ￿xed e⁄ects into account. As in Table 3, the estimated
e⁄ect of political competition is negative both in the OLS and IV estimations, but only
statistically signi￿cant using IV.
Finally, we analyze the hypothesis that municipalities with di⁄erent degrees of po-
litical competition respond di⁄erently to income shocks. Speci￿cally, in columns ￿ve
amd six, we interact political competition with income. Looking at the IV-estimates
in column six, we ￿nd some indication of the e⁄ect of an increase in income on public
party funding being larger in municipalities with a relatively low level of political com-
petition. The point estimates are quite imprecisely estimated, however, thus making it
hard to gauge the size of this e⁄ect.
We have also analyzed other dimensions of media coverage, such as the political
a¢ liation of the major newspaper, the presence of more than one local newspaper, and
the concentration of the local newspaper market.33 None of these variables turn out to
have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the level of rents. Perhaps most interesting, we ￿nd that
whether or not the leading newspaper and the ruling majority are ideologically aligned
does not appear to be of any importance for the level of rent extraction. These results
are not presented in order to save space.
33 The impact of the media market structure on monitoring e¢ ciency and potential reporting biases
is discussed in Djankov et al (2003), Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Besley and Prat (2006).
234.2 Is public ￿nancial party support really rents?
The results in the previous section are consistent with theories linking political rents
to political competition. However, it is not obvious that public ￿nancial party support
is a good measure of rents. After all, it is possible that voters have a preference for
public sponsoring of political parties. In this section, we provide evidence that excessive
public ￿nancial support to political parties is best viewed as rents. At the same time,
we will present further results on the e⁄ects of competition on the structure of public
support and the timing of changes in this variable. First, we show that also the sharing
rule of public support to parties depends on the party structure in the municipality.
Speci￿cally, it does so in a way consistent with the view that the ruling majority furthers
its own interest at the expense of the other parties. Then, we show that the timing of
increases in ￿nancial party support is inconsistent with a public interest view of those
￿nancial transfers. Finally, we show that the response to high competition is similar
in municipalities dominated by left- and right-wing parties, indicating that the results
cannot be readily explained by di⁄erences in preferences across voters.
4.2.1 The structure of ￿nancial party support
The municipality does not only decide on the size of public ￿nancial support to parties,
but also on the algorithm, or sharing rule, determining how much each party in the
municipality will receive. Thus, there are incentives to construct the sharing rule in
such a way that it bene￿ts the party in power at the expense of the other parties in
the local council. Most municipalities give the party support in two parts: a base sum
to each party and a variable part depending on the number of seats the party has in
the local council. Our hypothesis is that if parties bene￿t themselves, we should see
a larger support per seat, relative to the base sum per party, in municipalities where
there is a dominant large party or a concentrated party structure.
In order to study if this is the case, we have collected data on the exact construc-
tion of party support in the municipalities in 2003 through a survey. 207 out of 290
municipalities responded to our questionnaire. From this data, we construct a variable
24describing the size of the base (per party) support relative to the seat (per seat) sup-
port. If the variable base/seats takes a high value, it implies that there is a small party
bias in the construction of the sharing rule. If it takes a low value, the opposite applies.
As can be seen in Table 1, there is substantial variation in the structure of party sup-
port across municipalities. To measure the party structure, we construct the dummy
variable own majority that takes the value of one if a single party has a majority of
the seats in the local council, and her￿ndahl, which is the Her￿ndahl index of parties
in the local council.
The hypothesis is that both our measures of a concentrated party structure should
have negative e⁄ects on the base/seats variable. In the ￿rst two columns of Table 5,
we see that both her￿ndahl and own majority indeed have the predicted e⁄ects on
the structure of party support. The e⁄ects are highly statistically signi￿cant at the
one-percent level.34
It is not obvious which, if any, control variables should be included when estimating
the determinants of the sharing rule. We have run regressions including the total
number of seats in the council, the number of parties represented in the council, income
per capita, the size of the population and population density. The main results are
una⁄ected by the inclusion of these control variables, however.35
Due to the richness of the data, we are able to more closely investigate which political
bloc and parties are more sensitive to political competition. In column 3, we interact
the measure of party structure, her￿ndahl, with majority bloc to investigate if there are
any di⁄erences between the left- and right-wing blocs. According to the results, there
are no such di⁄erences. To further investigate this issue we construct measures of the
party structure within party bloc: Herf. in left (right) majority is the Her￿ndahl index
of parties within the left (right) bloc when the left(right) bloc is in majority. For the
municipalities with no obvious majority, we use the Her￿ndahl index of parties in the
local council, Herf. when no left/right majority. The results presented in column 4 show
34 The result remains the same if we exclude all municipalities (14 in total) where the structure of
party support is not best represented by a linear function of seats in the council.
35 The results are available upon request.
25no di⁄erences between the di⁄erent groups. Thus, a more fragmented party structure
leads to a sharing rule, which favors small parties both in the left- and right-wing blocs.
Finally, we study if the overallocation of funds di⁄ers depending on which speci￿c
party is in power. In the sample of municipalities, only three parties have more than
50 percent of the votes: The Centre Party (c); The Conservatives (m) and The Social
Democrates (s). We construct three dummies which take the value of one when the
speci￿c party ((c), (m) or (s)) has the majority of seats in the council. In the last
column, we see that all parties use their dominant positions, although the estimates
di⁄er across parties. Speci￿cally, it seems like the Conservative Party is more responsive
to the (lack of) competitive pressures than the two other parties.
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The result that large parties tend to bene￿t themselves at the expense of the other
parties in the local council is di¢ cult to reconcile with the view that voters￿preferences
lie behind public party support. This result is also di¢ cult to square with other reasons
for why there is a negative relationship between party support and political competition.
For example, one possible hypothesis is that parties at the central level strategically
spend more of their resources in regions where the share of swing voters is high, i.e.
where the degree of competition is high. Such behavior could reduce local parties￿
demand for local party ￿nancing. However, the result showing that the sharing rule
depends on the local party structure in a way consistent with local rent extraction
suggests that this is not the mechanism at work.
4.2.2 Electoral cycles in ￿nancial support
As previously mentioned, Ansolabehere et al (2003) ￿nd that the degree of both inter-
and intra party competition is strongly related to campaign spending in US gubernato-
rial elections. A similar pattern in public ￿nancial support to parties can be expected if
such spending is mainly due to voter demand for information. Further, given that the
value of information concerning the political alternatives is especially high in election
26years, we would expect ￿nancial party support to be relatively high during those years
in municipalities where competition is high.
Our hypothesis is that public party support should be viewed as a rent. Theoreti-
cally, political competition a⁄ects political rents by making politicians more sensitive to
voter demand. If voters display short-sightedness, it is likely that political competition
does not only a⁄ect the level of political rents, but also the timing of rent extraction.
In particular, we expect rent extraction to be relatively low close to elections in regions
where political competition is high.
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the following relationship:
Party Supportit = ￿i + ￿Party Supportit￿1 + ￿1Election yearit (9)
+￿2(Political competitioni ￿ Election yearit) + ￿Controlsit + ￿it:
In e⁄ect, this is a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence (DID) speci￿cation testing if the di⁄erence
between regions with high and low competition is di⁄erent during election years relative
to other years. If the interaction coe¢ cient ￿2 is negative, this means that the change
in rent extraction during election years is relatively low when competition is strong.
This would be consistent with the rent-extraction hypothesis, but not with a public
interest explanation of public-party ￿nancing.
Since we need annual data to perform this exercise, we can only test the relationship
among counties. Before turning to the analysis of the e⁄ects of political competition on
the timing of rent extraction, we investigate if the basic relationship between political
competition and rent extraction is also apparent among counties. Even though the
number of observations is low, the results reported in the ￿rst two columns of Table 6
are surprisingly similar to the results for municipalities presented in Table 3.36 Since
Swedish counties and municipalities are separate units of political administration, this is
a strong robustness check on the basic results for political competition. Thus, political
36 Since there is no natural connection between county boundaries and local media markets, we
have not included any media variables in the county-level regressions.
27competition appears to limit rent extraction in exactly the same way both among
counties and municipalities.
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Next, we turn to the results from running the above DID-speci￿cation with time
dummies presented in columns three and four and without time dummies presented in
the last two columns. The results show that among counties with strong political com-
petition, the increases in public ￿nancial party support are indeed relatively low during
election years. The estimates in column four imply that a county with a minimum level
of political competition increases party support by almost 2 Swedish kronor during an
election year, whereas a county with the maximum level of competition reduces party
support by 0.5 Swedish kronor. Once more, the empirical evidence thus supports the
rent-extraction hypothesis rather than a public interest story of these transfers. Here,
it is important to note that all county-level elections are held on the third Sunday in
September. In the late fall after the election, the budget for the post-election year is
approved by the newly elected council. For this reason, classifying the election years is
straightforward.
One problem with speci￿cation (9) is that the lagged dependent variable potentially
results in inconsistent estimates due to the dynamic panel data problem. Due to the
length of our panel (27 years), the problem is likely to be minor and the results from
an Arellano and Bond (1991) type GMM-estimation are close to identical to those in
Table 6. As the Arellano-Bond estimator is not particularly well-suited for a long and
narrow panel such as ours (Roodman, 2008), we do not present these results but they
are available upon request.
4.2.3 Financial support in left- and right wing municipalities
Besley and Preston (2007) show both theoretically and empirically that political com-
petition tends to make party-speci￿c policy preferences more moderate. Brie￿ y put,
they show that while left-wing governments increase spending more than right-wing
28ones, they do so less when competition is high. The reverse pattern can be observed
among right-wing governments. Thus, competition tends to result in policy convergence
between the political alternatives.
As can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, the share of left-wing voters in a municipality is
positively related to ￿nancial support to political parties. This result is consistent with
left-wing voters having a relatively strong preference for such support. Therefore, we use
the same intuition as Besley and Preston and run separate regressions for municipalities
that have been run by left- and right-wing majorities throughout the sample period.37
If the level of ￿nancial support were determined by party-speci￿c voter preferences, we
would expect high competition to reduce such support in left-wing municipalities, but
to increase it in right-wing ones. Table 7 shows this not to be the case. Rather, high
competition tends to reduce ￿nancial support in both left- and right-wing municipalities.
That the point estimates are not highly statistically signi￿cant is not surprising, since
we are now studying a small sample of municipalities with very low initial political
competition.
TABLE 7 HERE
These results go against the view that ￿nancial support to political parties is deter-
mined by party-speci￿c voter preferences moderated by political competition.
4.3 Accountability and wages
So far, the focus has been on the ￿nancial party support with which local governments
reward the political parties represented in the local council. Now, we turn to another
proxy for political rents: politicians￿wages. The ￿rst column in Table 8 presents the
results when estimating the e⁄ect of political competition on the wage paid to the
37 Municipalities are classi￿ed as right- (left-) wing if the parties that constitute the right- (left-)
wing bloc have had more than 50 percent of the votes in all elections during the time period.
29chairman of the executive board in 1999. The results are in line with the evidence
presented earlier and suggest that municipalities with low political competition and
low newspaper coverage are associated with higher wages. As shown in column two,
the result is not due to endogeneity of political competition. To gauge the size of
the e⁄ect, suppose that the absolute di⁄erence between blocs were to increase by one
standard deviation (about 15 percent). Then, wages would increase by 4.6 percent. If
newspaper coverage were to increase by one standard deviation, wages would decrease
by 2.3 percent. Columns three and four show that also our second measure of political
competition cut point density yields similar results.
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As for the control variables, there are several reasons to expect a positive e⁄ect of
income on politicians￿wages. One reason is that it is easier to extract rents if there are
more resources to extract. Another is that politicians may be rewarded for performance.
In this case, they get a higher pay if they act to increase local income, a reason stressed
in a study of the determinants of US gubernatorial wages by Di Tella and Fisman (2004).
Finally, high income may increase the politicians￿reservation wage. This e⁄ect should
also be picked up by our measure of average house prices in the municipality. However,
there is no e⁄ect of either of these variables in the ￿rst two columns of Table 8. In 1995,
income seems to have the predicted positive e⁄ect on politicians￿wages (columns 3 and
4). As could be expected, a larger population and thus greater responsibility lead to
an increase in wages. Interestingly, the share of left-wing votes has no e⁄ect on wages.
This should be compared to the positive e⁄ect of the share of left-wing votes on the
level of ￿nancial party support.
The next four columns show the results when making use of panel data. When
controlling for municipality ￿xed e⁄ects, there are no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects
of either political competition or media coverage. This result suggests that omitted
variables may be driving the results. Alternatively, there is not enough variation within
municipalities to identify a signi￿cant e⁄ect on wages.
305 Conclusion
This paper exploits data on public ￿nancial support to political parties and politicians￿
wages among Swedish local governments to analyze the relation between political ac-
countability and political rent extraction in a non-corrupt democracy. In line with the
predictions of political agency models, we ￿nd that both increased political competition
and increased local media coverage reduce the level of rents. Further, we ￿nd that both
the structure and the timing of public party ￿nancing support the hypothesis that polit-
ical parties exploit limited political competition to enrich themselves. Thus, this paper
presents the ￿rst direct evidence of which we are aware, supporting the theoretically
long-discussed link between electoral biases that limits political competition and legal
political rent extraction.
The results for public ￿nancial support indicate that moving from the lowest to the
highest within sample degree of political competition would cut public party support by
approximately 36 percent. The e⁄ect of media coverage is also substantial. These results
do not seem to be caused by omitted variables or endogeneity problems, as they are
robust to the inclusion of municipality-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects and using an instrumental
variable approach. Wages are also lower in municipalities where the level of political
competition is strong and local newspaper coverage is high. However, it is possible
that these results are caused by some omitted variables, as we ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ects
when using panel data.
A natural extension to this work would be to investigate the e⁄ects of limited politi-
cal competition along other policy dimensions. It might be the case that low competition
results in some rent extraction, but that the overall e⁄ects are positive, for example
by increasing the time horizon of the politicians in power. Previous studies of political
competition (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Besley and Case, 2003; Besley et al, 2005) indi-
cate that increased political competition is likely to have positive e⁄ects on the quality
of policy. Ferraz and Finan (2007), on the other hand, ￿nd a positive relation between
the quality of public policy and corruption. What is true in the Swedish context is still
31an open question.
Another issue is the relationship between voter information and political competi-
tion. In the theoretical and empirical analysis, we have assumed voter information and
political competition to be independently determined. Even if there is no correlation
between the two variables in our data, it might, however, be the case that they are
jointly determined. For example, swing voters may have a greater incentive to become
informed about the political alternative. There is de￿nitely scope for further research
to study the possible joint determination of these factors.
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35Data appendix 
 
The main units of observation are Swedish municipalities. All municipalities have an official 
code reported in the publication SCB (2007). Out of a total of 290 municipalities (in 2003), 
we drop municipalities for the following reasons. 
 
Municipalities that have split or merged since 1974: 
Codes: 117 (Österåker), 127 (Botkyrka), 128 (Salem), 140 (Nykvarn), 181 (Södertälje), 187 
(Vaxholm), 330 (Knivsta), 461 (Gnesta), 480 (Nyköping), 488 (Trosa), 583 (Motala), 584 
(Vadstena), 1229 (Bara), 1263 (Svedala), 1443 (Bollebygd), 1445 (Essunga), 1470 (Vara), 
1490 (Borås), 1814 (Lekeberg), 1880 (Örebro), 2403 (Bjurholm), 2417 (Norsjö), 2425 
(Dorotea), 2460 (Vännäs), 2463 (Åsele) 
 
Municipalities dropped in the post-1995 period due to misreported values of public party 
support.  
Codes: 120 (Värmdö), 123 (Järfälla), 183 (Sundbyberg), 509 (Ödeshög), 1419 (Tjörn), 2184 
(Hudiksvall), 2401 (Nordmaling), 2404 (Vindeln), 2409 (Robertsfors), 2521 (Pajala), 2584 
(Kiruna) 
 
Municipalities dropped in the pre-1995 period due to misreported values of public party 
support: 
Codes: 2401 (Nordmaling), 2409 (Robertsfors), 2584 (Kiruna) 
 
Municipalities dropped in the cross-sectional studies due to missing data for the instrument 
polcomp68: 
Code: 481 (Oxelösund), 1885 (Lindesberg), 2418 (Malå)  
 
Municipalities dropped in the panel studies due to missing data for the instrument blocdiff: 
Code: 980 (Gotland). Table A1. Data description and sources 
Variable  Description  Source 
     
Party support  Public financial party support per capita (post election years 




Wage  Monthly salary paid to the highest ranking full-time employed 
politician (post election years 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1986, 




Base/seat   The ratio between base (per party) public party support and per 




One minus the absolute difference between the vote share of the 
left-wing (Social Democrats, the Left Party (former 
Communists), the Green Party) and the right-wing (the 
Conservatives, the Liberals, the Centre Party, the Christian 
Democrats, and New Democracy) parties. We use both the 





Cutpoint density measure of swing voters (years 1992 and 
1995). See text for definition. 
EJ (2003) 
Polcomp68  Absolute difference between the vote share of the left-wing and 
the right-wing parties in the 1968 national election. 
SSD 
Blocdiff  The average difference between the vote share of the left-wing 
(right-wing) and the right-wing (left-wing) parties in bordering 
municipalities for municipalities governed by a left-wing (right-
wing) majority 
SS 
Coverage  Sum of household coverage of local newspapers (percent of 
households that read a particular paper) that have a coverage of 
at least 10 percent and are published at least twice a week. 
TS 
Income   Taxable income per capita.  SS 
Population  Population size.  SS 
Pop density  Population density.  SS 
Public exp  Total public expenditure as a share of total municipal taxable 
income. 
SALAR(2) 
Tax rate  Municipal tax rate.  SS 
High edu  The share of the population with at least some post-secondary 
education (available from 1985). 
SS 
Leftwing  Vote share of left-wing parties  SS 
Seats  Number of seats in the municipal assembly.  SS 
Herfindahl  Herfindahl index of parties in the local assembly.  SS 
Own majority  Dummy taking the value of one if a single party holds more 
than 50% of the seats in the municipal assembly. 
SS 
Parties  Number of parties in municipal assembly.  SS 
Age 0-15  Share of population aged 0-15.  SS 
Age 65+  Share of population aged 65 and above.  SS 
Woman  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the chairman of the 
executive committee is a woman. 
KA 
Age  Age of the chairman of the executive committee.  KA 
House prices  Average price of a free-standing house in the municipality  SS 
SALAR is the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions: (1) “Kommunalt förtroendevalda och 
deras arvoden” (1974-2000), (2) “Årsboken för Sveriges kommuner” (1976-2006); SS is Statistics Sweden, 
downloaded from “Statistikdatabasen” http://www.ssd.scb.se/; SKL is downloaded from www.webor.se; SSD is 
Svensk Samhällsvetenskaplig Datatjänst, dataset number 0148; KA is KommunAktuellt (various issues 1980-
2000); TS is Tidningsstatistik AB, “TS-boken” (1974-2003); OWN is from a survey conducted by the authors in 
June-September 2006. For more information about how the data is coded see under Table A3; EJ (2003) is 
Johansson (2003). 




 per capita 
Base support  
per party 
Support per  
seat  Population 
         
Municipalities with the lowest level of party support per capita 
Söderköping  8  1500  1422  14009 
Torsås  12  2196  2125  7293 
Kil  13  7000  3000  11892 
Munkedal  14  3500  3500  10434 
Bengtsfors  15  2550  1785  10516 
Kungälv  15  11400  8300  37912 
Vårgårda  15  3000  3100  10668 
Valdemarsvik  16  5000  2400  8230 
Vellinge  16  0  9650  31087 
Svenljunga  16  1000  4025  10529 
         
Municipalities with the highest level of party support per capita 
Övertorneå  78  19300  7720  5391 
Vilhelmina  85  50000  10000  7655 
Jokkmokk  85  10000  11500  5782 
Gotland  86    47033  57381 
Ockelbo  87      6101 
Timrå  87  14957  29122  17784 
Arvidsjaur  88  15000  17055  7017 
Boden  92  79590  29215  28268 
Arjeplog  117  0  12419  3291 
Haparanda  121  38600  19300  10334 
Note: 207 out of 290 did answer our survey on the structure of party support. 
Therefore, data on Base support per party and Support per seat is missing for 
some municipalities. All values in fixed (2000) SEK.  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
variable  N  mean  median  sd  min  max 
             
                                Municipalities 
             
Party support  2537  31.73  29.04  14.44  4.35  115.23 
Wage 1000 SEK  1748  27.83  27.48  5.812  13.81  71.22 
Base/seats  207  1.39  1  1.49  0  15.31 
Political competition  2537  0.81  0.84  0.14  0.27  1 
Cutpoint density  492  0.03  9.03  0.01  0.01  0.05 
Herfindahl  254  0.25  0.83  0.05  0.18  0.48 
Own majority  254  0.13  0.27  0.34  0  1 
Polcomp68  2510  0.20  0  0.15  0.00  0.64 
Blocdiff  2518    0.07   0.09  0.16  -0.39    0.58 
Coverage  2524  86.14  86.00  19.77  19.07  178 
Income 1000 SEK  2537  90.95    0.88  19.73    41.590    245.78 
Population  2537  30221.50  16010  56016.85  3046  758148 
Pop density  2537  106.52  26.41  339.25  0.25  4047.99 
High edu  1523  0.11  0.10  0.05  0.04  0.43 
Leftwing  2537  0.50  0.50  0.12  0.13  0.83 
Seats  254  46.30  45  11.65  31  101 
Parties  254  7.14  7  0.83  5  8 
Woman  2022  0.12  0  0.32  0  1 
Age  1771  50.81  51  7.74  25  71 
House prices 1000 SEK  2530  668.012  585.16  338.82  163.53  3908.60 
             
Counties 
             
Party support  606  19.54  18.87  4.94  8.82  37.47 
Political competition  611  0.87  0.87  0.09  0.59  0.99 
Income 1000 SEK  629  95.91  94.38  15.52  73.78  160.56 
Population  629  353793.70  272539  319136.50  127645  1860872 
Public exp  627  17.52  17.29  2.55  12.22  29.12 
Leftwing  611  0.53  0.53  0.07  0.38  0.69 
For municipalities, see Table A1 for sources and definitions. For counties, the following sources are used: Party 
support and Public exp are from Svenska kommunförbundet “Statistisk årsbok för landsting” (1976-2005); 
Political competition, Income, Population, and Leftwing are from Statistics Sweden “Statistikdatabasen” 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Main results for political competition 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Public financial support to political parties (per capita) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS-FE  IV-FE  OLS-FE  OLS-IV 
  2003  2003  1995  1995  1974-2003  1974-2003  1992-1995  1992-1995 
                 
Political  -15.92**  -21.51*      -3.04  -26.26**     
competition  (7.30)  (12.55)      (2.82)  (12.91)     
Cut point      -520.78***  -842.81**      -133.40***  -177.83* 
density      (152.19)  (361.76)      (48.07)  (104.36) 
                 
Income  13.59  10.03  32.04***  28.18**  -9.98  -9.40  -6.09  -2.00 
  (13.08)  (15.00)  (10.70)  (11.06)  (8.58)  (8.44)  (28.05)  (28.29) 
Population  -0.13  0.24  -0.79  -0.11  -12.33***  -9.91**  -4.29  1.77 
  (1.99)  (2.00)  (1.55)  (1.57)  (4.60)  (4.78)  (26.67)  (31.12) 
Leftwing  54.69***  53.15***  47.57***  37.47***  6.78  4.55  -2.95  -4.13 
  (8.34)  (8.92)  (8.32)  (12.52)  (7.19)  (8.50)  (15.46)  (16.21) 
High edu.  -16.61  -15.47  -37.91  -41.41      43.87  41.48 
  (30.68)  (30.72)  (30.77)  (31.47)      (110.24)  (111.76) 
                 
Mun effects          Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects          Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-test    101.18    31.15    320.52    68.95 
                 
Observations  251  251  244  244  2528  2528  492  492 
R-squared  0.19    0.36    0.75    0.94   
The dependent variable is public party support per capita. F-test reports the F-statistics on the instrument from the first-stage regression. The instrument for political 
competition and cut point density is polcomp68 in columns (2) and (4) and blockdiff  in columns (6) and (8). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. In columns (5) 
and (6) standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p< 0.1. Constant not presented. Table 4. Adding media and effects of shocks 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Public financial support to political parties (per capita) 
  OLS  IV  OLS-FE  IV-FE  OLS-FE  IV-FE 
  2003  2003  1974-2003  1974-2003  1974-2003  1974-2003 
             
Coverage  -0.13*  -0.14*  -0.08**  -0.10**  -0.08**  -0.09** 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Political  -18.66***  -26.54**  -3.68  -28.32**  -4.51  -28.20** 
competition  (7.08)  (12.69)  (2.83)  (13.16)  (2.99)  (13.42) 
Polcomp ×          -10.35  -60.40* 
income          (10.04)  (33.53) 
             
Income  5.98  1.90  -8.52  -7.69  -1.13  35.29 
  (13.82)  (15.97)  (8.61)  (8.46)  (10.75)  (24.87) 
Population  -0.18  0.28  -14.31***  -12.00**  -13.81***  -9.55* 
  (1.95)  (2.01)  (4.50)  (4.68)  (4.50)  (5.15) 
Leftwing  53.05***  51.87***  4.98  2.15  5.13  3.57 
  (8.23)  (9.09)  (7.14)  (8.63)  (7.22)  (9.33) 
High edu.  -9.80  -9.64         
  (30.83)  (30.89)         
             
Mun effects      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-test    91.75    313.23    157.43 
F-test (interact)            165.51 
             
Observations  254  251  2515  2515  2515  2515 
R-squared  0.20    0.75    0.75   
The dependent variable is public party support per capita. F-test reports the F-statistics on the instrument from 
the first-stage regression (both the direct effect and for the interaction term, where applicable). The instrument 
for political competition is polcomp68 in column (2) and blockdiff in columns (4) and (6). Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses. In columns  (3) - (6) standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant not presented.  
 
Table 5. The structure of party support 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Base/mandate 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
  2003  2003  2003  2003  2003 
           
Herfindahl  -5.60***     -6.26**     
  (2.02)    (2.54)     
Own majority    -0.46***       
    (0.17)       
Herfindahl´ left      0.57     
      (1.07)     
Herfindahl´ right      1.14     
      (1.34)     
Herf. in left majority        -3.65**   
        (1.63)   
Herf. in right majority        -3.78**   
        (1.85)   
Herf when no left/right        -3.02   
majority        (1.84)   
           
C own majority          -0.65*** 
          (0.12) 
M own majority          -1.44*** 
          (0.12) 
S own majority          -0.41** 
          (0.17) 
           
Observations  207  207  207  207  207 
R-squared  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.01 
The dependent variable is the financial party support (base) divided with the per seat financial support (seat). 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant not presented. 
  
Table 6. Election cycles in party support (county level) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Public financial support to political parties (per capita) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS-FE  IV-FE 
  2003  2003  1977-2003  1977-2003  1977-2003  1977-2003 
             
Political  -17.88  -47.53*  0.37  -0.24  1.13  1.47 
competition  (12.50)  (25.17)  (1.06)  (2.01)  (1.42)  (1.80) 
Election year×      -5.80***  -6.88**  -5.43***  -5.35 
pol comp      (1.82)  (3.05)  (1.83)  (3.33) 
Election year      5.26***  6.20**     
      (1.54)  (2.66)     
             
Income  -8.82  -21.36*  2.84**  2.71***  3.64  3.49 
  (12.79)  (11.95)  (1.07)  (0.97)  (7.05)  (6.84) 
Population  -1.57  -1.09  -6.34**  -5.96**  -10.23**  -10.45*** 
  (1.76)  (1.75)  (2.69)  (2.72)  (3.77)  (3.62) 
Leftwing  33.79**  -4.24  0.86  0.42  -6.22  -6.26* 
  (14.00)  (44.41)  (2.15)  (2.69)  (3.85)  (3.72) 
Party supportt-1      0.74***  0.74***  0.70***  0.70*** 
      (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
             
County effects      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects          Yes  Yes 
F-test    11.87    177.35    112.18 
F-test (interact)        118.17    77.16 
             
Observations  20  20  573  573  573  573 
R-squared  0.64    0.88    0.89   
The dependent variable is public party support per capita. F-test reports the F-statistics on the instrument from 
the first-stage regression (both the direct effect and for the interaction term, where applicable). The instrument 
for political competition and is polcomp60 in column (2) and blockdiff  in columns (4) and (6). Robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses. In columns  (3)-(6) standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p< 0.1. Constant not presented. Table 7. Right-wing and left-wing municipalities 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Public financial support to political parties (per capita) 
  Right-wing  Left-wing 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
  2003  2003  1995  1995  2003  2003  1995  1995 
                 
Political  0.43  -20.84      -31.16*  -67.65     
competition  (14.63)  (26.50)      (17.34)  (50.05)     
Cut point      -419.68  -1,113.93      -555.25*  -1,382.16* 
density      (487.29)  (942.43)      (296.52)  (761.54) 
Income  8.38  3.66  -4.81  -2.94  -49.90  -85.04  46.13  40.43 
  (14.12)  (13.63)  (21.68)  (21.20)  (41.73)  (61.92)  (37.32)  (42.01) 
Coverage  -0.10  -0.09  -0.05  -0.06  -0.10  -0.12  -0.22**  -0.30** 
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.13) 
Population  5.00  6.54**  5.19  4.65  -1.91  0.88  -5.54  -4.09 
  (2.99)  (3.32)  (3.58)  (3.69)  (4.06)  (6.21)  (3.82)  (3.62) 
High edu.  -17.04  -39.37  3.11  -30.05  85.88  112.36  34.96  60.49 
  (39.27)  (46.72)  (61.39)  (67.48)  (107.43)  (94.70)  (115.56)  (124.18) 
                 
F-test    8.83    4.03    7.62    17.82 
                 
Observations  41  41  41  41  68  68  68  68 
R-squared  0.20    0.23    0.08    0.16   
The dependent variable is public party support per capita. In the sample of municipalities used in (1) - (4), the 
right-wing bloc has had more than 50 percent of the votes in all elections 1974-2003. Equivalent but left-wing in 
(5) - (8). F-test reports the F-statistics on the instrument from the first-stage regression. The instrument for 
political competition is polcomp68. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Constant not presented. Table 8. Wages 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Wage of highest paid politician (ln) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS-FE  IV-FE  OLS-FE  IV-FE 








                 
Political  -0.31***  -0.21**      -0.03  0.04     
competition  (0.09)  (0.11)      (0.04)  (0.13)     
Cut point      -2.73**  -5.34*      -0.60  1.90 
density      (1.26)  (2.83)      (1.03)  (2.79) 
Coverage/1000  -1.42***  -1.30**  -0.41  -0.46  0.00  0.04  0.15  0.10 
  (0.50)  (0.52)  (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.55)  (0.60) 
                 
Woman  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02         
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)         
Age  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01         
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)         
Age
2  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00         
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)         
House prices  0.06  0.04  -0.02  -0.00  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.06 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
Income  0.07  0.15  0.47***  0.40***  0.15  0.15  -0.22  -0.49 
  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.46)  (0.53) 
Population  0.10***  0.09***  0.08***  0.09***  0.04  0.04  0.06  -0.25 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.41)  (0.42) 
Leftwing  -0.05  -0.02  -0.08  -0.14  -0.11  -0.10  0.01  0.05 
  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
High edu  0.37  0.38  0.20  0.14         
  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.29)  (0.29)         
                 
Mun effects          Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects          Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-test    98.68    36.29    261.24    73.06 
                 
Observations  254  254  245  245  2179  2179  490  490 
R-squared  0.54    0.58    0.77    0.90   
The dependent variable is the wage of the highest paid politician. F-test reports the F-statistics on the instrument 
from the first-stage regression. The instrument for political competition and cut point density is polcomp68 in 
columns (2) and (4) and blockdiff in columns (6) and (8). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. In 
columns (5) - (8) standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 













1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
year
High political competition Low political competition
 
Note: The vertical axis shows municipal-level party support per capita in fixed (2000) prices. 
High political competition refers to municipalities where the average political competition is 
above the 75
th percentile. Low political competition refers to municipalities where the average 
political competition is below the 25
th percentile. 









1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
year
One party in power Not one party in power
 
Note: The vertical axis shows council-level party support per capita in fixed (2000) prices. 
One party in power refers to the eleven counties where one party has been part of the ruling 
majority throughout the period. Not one party in power refers to the remaining twelve 
counties. 
 
 
 
 
 